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Metaphysically Reductive Causation 
Ned Hall and L. A. Paul 
 
There are, by now, many rival, sophisticated philosophical accounts of causation 
that qualify as ‘metaphysically reductive’. A good thing: these collective efforts have 
vastly improved our understanding of causation over the last 30 years or so. They 
also put us in an excellent position to reflect on some central methodological ques-
tions: What exactly is the point of offering a metaphysical reduction of causation? 
What philosophical scruples ought to guide the pursuit of such a reduction? Finally, 
how should answers to these latter questions affect one’s assessment of the main 
contemporary approaches? That’s the stuff we’ll be investigating in this essay. 
§1 will lay out our presuppositions. §2 will review a sample of philosophical ac-
counts. Then comes the main event: §3 will look in detail at the foregoing methodo-
logical questions, closing with a reconsideration of our sample accounts, in light of 
what we’ve found. 
§1 Framework 
§1.1 Metaphysical assumptions about causation 
We  will  mostly  assume  that  the  fundamental  causal  relata  are  events,1 T h e s e  
events are particulars, located in spacetime. We will not treat causation as a relation 
between types of events, although we grant that general causal claims can be made 
apparently concerning event types, viz. “overexposure to the sun causes sunburn.”2 
We focus instead on singular causal claims – e.g., “Suzy’s overexposure to the sun 
caused her sunburn.” 
                                                 
1 In fact we are both skeptical about this assumption. We assume it merely for simplicity and uni-
formity, as the vast majority of analyses treat causation as a relation between events. We will flag spe-
cific reasons for skepticism as we go along. 
2 One of us (NH) thinks such claims are really certain kinds of generalizations concerning token-
level event causation. To think of them as expressing a metaphysically interesting relation between 
event types would be just as confused as thinking that “hens lay eggs” expresses some biologically 
interesting relation between a type of animal and a type of physiological product. In other words, the 
generic form of these claims easily misleads. See Nickel (2008) for helpful instruction on how not to 
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We also assume a broadly reductionist outlook, according to which facts about 
which events cause which other events are fixed, somehow, by (i) the facts about 
what happens, together with (ii) the facts about the fundamental laws that govern 
what happens. Minimally, that’s a supervenience thesis: no two possible worlds differ 
with respect to what causes what without differing with respect either to what hap-
pens, or to what the fundamental laws are that govern what happens. But as will be-
come apparent, the most important philosophical approaches to causation aim for 
something arguably stronger, namely, an account of causation that lays bare how 
causal facts are grounded in or depend upon these more basic facts. We’ll come back to 
this point as we proceed, and will introduce some of the most influential accounts in 
§2, below. 
As to (i), we take these to include all facts about what particulars exist at what 
times,  and  what  categorical  properties  and  relations  these  particulars  instantiate. 
(Perhaps we can be bolder still, and take (i) to be exhausted by the facts about the 
total history of complete physical states that the world occupies; we won’t need to 
take a stand on this.) As to (ii), the laws we have in mind are the fundamental dy-
namical laws of the sort that, we can hope, current physics is in the process of reveal-
ing to us. (These are to be distinguished from the so-called “laws” of the special sci-
ences.) Taking such physics as our model, we think of these laws as something like 
rules that determine how complete physical states of the world generate successive 
physical states (see Maudlin 2007b). 
We shall not investigate the metaphysical nature of these laws, although we will 
assume, purely for the sake of simplicity, that they are deterministic, and that they 
permit neither backwards causation nor causation across a temporal gap.3 Perhaps 
they  somehow  consist  in  mere  regularities ( L o e w e r  1 9 9 6 ).  Perhaps  they  rest  on 
firmer metaphysical foundations – e.g., necessary connections between universals 
(Armstrong 1983). Perhaps they are metaphysically primitive (Maudlin 2007b). Any 
account of laws that does not build on an antecedent notion of cause can serve as 
background for the sorts of issues confronting reductive analyses that we will be 
considering. 
                                                 
3 Despite appearances, these constraints on the laws do not require causal notions for their ar-
ticulation. Determinism is just the thesis that two nomologically possible worlds that agree on their 
histories up to time t agree simpliciter. The prohibition on backwards causation can be understood as 
the requirement that spacetime contain no closed time-like curves. And the prohibition on causation 
at a temporal distance can be implemented by requiring that, for any two nomologically possible 
worlds w1 and w2, if the complete physical state of w1 at t1 is the same as a complete physical state of 
w2 at t2, then the t1-probability distribution over possible futures at w1 is identical to the t2-probability 
distribution over possible futures at w2 (in other words, the present state of the world renders facts 
about the past irrelevant to what happens in the future). Metaphysically Reductive Causation       
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§1.2 Neuron diagrams 
In laying out examples, we make extensive use of “neuron diagrams” (popular-
ized by Lewis: see in particular his 1986b). Here is a sample: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
Circles  represent  neurons;  arrows  represent  stimulatory  connections  between 
neurons; lines ending with black dots represent inhibitory connections. Shading a 
circle indicates that the neuron fires, with the temporal order read from left to right. 
Bold capitals name neurons, italicized capitals events of their firing. Thus, in Figure 
1, neurons A and C fire simultaneously; C sends a stimulatory signal to D, causing it 
to fire, while A sends a stimulatory signal to B. But, since C also sends an inhibitory 
signal to B, B does not fire. Finally, D sends a stimulatory signal to E, causing it to 
fire. Figure 2 shows what would have happened if C had not fired:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
Neuron diagrams earn their keep by representing complex situations clearly and 
forcefully, allowing the reader to take in at a glance their central causal characteris-
tics. However, they can also mislead: used carelessly, they can oversimplify an exam-
ple, draw unwarranted attention to certain features of a case and underemphasize 
others, and even outright misrepresent the causal structure of the case. In addition, 
there are interesting problems, some of which we will mention below, that their use 
may obscure from view. So their prominence in this essay should not suggest that we 
think that every interesting and important feature of an example can be boiled down 
C
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to a neuron diagram, and where necessary we will take pains to highlight those fea-
tures that cannot.  
§1.3 A subtlety about metaphysics and reduction 
We are interested in focusing on philosophical treatments of causation that see 
causal relations among events as somehow metaphysically dependent upon more meta-
physically basic facts (concerning what happens, and what the fundamental laws are). 
That is, we’re interested in reductive accounts of causation. That can raise a puzzle, 
though, concerning what the point of disagreement could be between rival such ac-
counts. This puzzle is quite general, and has nothing per se to do with causation. All 
the same, it is important to get it out on the table, since attention to the philosophi-
cal issues it raises will frequently matter in what follows. 
Here it is, in the (very!) abstract. Billy and Suzy, let us suppose, are having a dis-
pute about the nature of some philosophically interesting category X. (X might be 
free will, or identity through time, or the nature of moral facts, or causation….) They 
have what is, apparently, a factual disagreement about X: Billy says it’s one thing, Suzy 
says it’s another. But let us further suppose that they agree completely on what belongs 
to the fundamental structure of reality: say, they both think that reality consists in a 
succession of complete physical states in space and time, which succession is gov-
erned by certain fundamental laws. And just to be clear, they have no disagreements 
about what the structure of these states might be, or what space and time are, or 
what the metaphysical nature of fundamental laws is, etc. (Maybe they both think it’s 
all fundamentally atoms in the void, moving about under the direction of Newtonian 
laws.) And yet they disagree about the nature of X. 
The puzzle is that it can seem that there is no longer anything substantive for this 
agreement to be about. “You both agree on the fundamental facts,” one wants to say. 
“Isn’t the rest just talk?” Compare an argument Billy and Suzy might have about 
whether viruses are alive. Neither is a vitalist: both agree that facts about what’s alive 
and what’s not somehow reduce to biochemical facts – about which, in turn, they 
have no disagreement. How could their dispute about viruses possibly be genuinely 
substantive or factual? 
Maybe it couldn’t. That is certainly one intelligible, defensible view. Quite gener-
ally, one might adopt the following meta-metaphysical principle: Any metaphysical dis-
pute over the nature of some feature of reality X must, in order to be genuinely substantive and non-
terminological, trace to a dispute over the nature of fundamental reality. Maybe X itself is recog-
nized to be a feature of fundamental reality, in which case the principle obviously 
holds. Maybe X is some not-very-philosophically-interesting feature – for example, 
the dispute might concern whether it is raining outside. Again the principle holds, Metaphysically Reductive Causation       
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since we can reconstruct this dispute, in a rather labored fashion, as a dispute about 
whether the detailed disposition of the fundamental facts is such as to make it the 
case that it’s raining outside. But maybe X is some vastly philosophically significant 
feature  of  reality,  nevertheless  recognized  to  be  non-fundamental:  and  here,  the 
thought goes, the principle yields something of value, by showing us that if we want 
our dispute about the nature of X to be genuine, then we had better figure out how it 
hinges on a disagreement about fundamental reality. 
We don’t know whether this principle is correct. All we wish to urge here is that 
however attractive and obvious it may seem when one looks at some debates – e.g., 
Billy and Suzy’s debate about whether viruses are truly alive – one should not auto-
matically assume that it holds across the board. Suppose, this time, that Billy and Suzy 
are arguing over whether the statue is identical to the lump of clay that it is made 
from.4 Once again, they agree that all that exists, fundamentally, are atoms in the 
void, subject to such-and-such fundamental laws. What they disagree about is how 
many ways those atoms combine to compose nonfundamental objects.5 In cases such as this, we 
think it hasty to insist that their debate cannot possibly be substantive.  
An apt rejoinder: “Fine. Maybe their debate is substantive, after all. But how?? Ex-
plain, please.” Here’s why, in our view, the rejoinder is apt: even though (we think!) 
the meta-metaphysical principle cannot reasonably be assumed a priori, it can be 
taken to locate the burden of proof, in that one who rejects it, in a specific case, 
owes an account of exactly how a debate about non-fundamental feature X can be 
substantive, in the face of full agreement about what’s fundamental.  
Example. Return to Billy and Suzy’s statue/clay debate. The meta-metaphysical 
argument that this debate is substantive, even though both parties agree that funda-
mentally, it’s all just law-governed atoms in the void, might proceed as follows: Stat-
ues, and lumps of clay, are not themselves fundamental entities. Rather, they are con-
stituted by such entities. But (and here comes the crucial move) there can be substan-
tive disagreement about what is required for genuine constitution. More specifically, Billy 
and Suzy might both hold that the statue and lump of clay are constituted by particles, 
by being mereological fusions of particles. (On mereology – the theory of parts and 
wholes – see Simons 1987, Lewis 1991.) And they might agree that the particles that 
are ultimate parts of the statue are all and only the particles that are ultimate parts of 
the piece of clay. But they might disagree over a basic question of mereology: namely, 
                                                 
4 See for example Fine (2003). 
5 It’s important for the example that facts about composition don’t themselves count as funda-
mental – plausible, since they concern a relation between fundamental entities and nonfundamental 
entities. Metaphysically Reductive Causation       
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whether, given some entities (the particles, in this case), they have a unique mere-
ological fusion. It is because that disagreement is substantive that their disagreement 
about whether the statue and the piece of clay are one and the same object is, too.  
We recognize that those attracted to the meta-metaphysical principle will grum-
ble. Maybe they will want to say that it’s just a confusion to think that the correct 
principle about mereological fusions is at all controversial. Whatever. Here, we wish 
only to caution you, the reader, that it is philosophically naïve to treat as obvious that 
agreement over fundamental reality must render any disagreement over the nature of 
causation purely terminological. 
Finally, suppose some such disagreement is terminological: really, it concerns not 
the facts about what causation is, but rather which of the many aspects of reality that 
both sides agree there are to call “causation”. For all that, it may be a disagreement 
well worth having – and so not at all “terminological”, in the dismissive sense that 
might  apply  to  saying  that  debate  was  “merely  verbal”  (compare  a  debate  over 
whether whales are fish; see Chalmers 2011). In general, it matters for our intellectual 
aims – especially our explanatory aims – that we categorize things well. And so it 
might matter quite a lot what we choose to call “causation”. The dismisser says, 
“You agree on what’s fundamental; the rest is just talk.” To which a good reply is, 
“Yes – but it can sometimes matter quite a lot that we construct our talk well.” 
§2 The map of rivals 
This section sketches some of the most significant rival approaches to providing 
a philosophical account of causation. We start with an approach that has unjustly 
fallen into disfavor. 
§2.1 Regularity accounts 
What have been called “regularity” accounts of causation have been guided by 
two quite distinct ideas. First idea: Causal relations between events should be ana-
lyzed as instances of lawful regularities. Thus Davidson (1967) suggests, roughly, that 
when C causes E, there must be some suitable descriptions of these events – as, say, 
the F-event and the G-event, respectively – such that there is a law connecting F-
events with G-events. (Davidson’s own candidate for such a law unhelpfully includes 
the word “cause” in its statement: not a good idea, given that the paradigm examples 
of fundamental laws provided by physics never do so.) Second idea: What is distinc-
tive of the causes of some event is that they lawfully suffice for it, at least in the cir-
cumstances (and: given determinism). Probably the best known account along these 
lines comes from Mackie (1965), although we will present it here in a form borrowed 
from Lewis (1973a): C causes E iff C and E both occur, and there is some suitably Metaphysically Reductive Causation       
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chosen auxiliary proposition F describing the circumstances of C’s occurrence such 
that (i) in any nomologically possible world in which C occurs and F is true, E oc-
curs; (ii) in some nomologically possible world in which F is true, and C does not 
occur, E does not occur. In short, C is an essential part of some set of conditions 
that is lawfully sufficient for E.  
The two guiding ideas should be kept carefully separate. The first has insuperable 
problems, which we will return to below (§3.3.1). The second has more merit. But it 
also needs a more careful expression than that given above, since it is too unclear 
how to pick out the auxiliary proposition F. Here is a better way to proceed: Start 
with  the  observation  that  F  must,  presumably,  include  a  description  of  the  other 
causes with which C combines to bring about E. That leads to the suggestion that 
what is key is that the set S of causes of an event E should collectively suffice for that 
event, but should do so non-redundantly: i.e., no proper subset of S should suffice for 
E. Then S had better not include all the causes of E, occurring at any time, since later 
ones will render earlier ones redundant, and vice versa. So let us require merely that 
the set of causes of E that occur at some given time (before E occurs) non-redundantly 
suffice for E. That amendment still clearly does justice to the guiding idea. We arrive 
at the following provisional analysis: C is a cause of E just in case for some time t 
earlier than E, C belongs to a set of events occurring at t that non-redundantly suf-
fices for E. 
What remains is to say what “suffice” means. Here is a first pass. A set S of 
events suffices for (later) event E just in case the occurrence of those events lawfully 
guarantees that E occurs: in any nomologically possible world in which all the mem-
bers of S occur, E occurs. Notice that on this reading, our regularity account does 
not in any interesting sense view causal relations as “instances” of “covering laws”, in 
the way that Davidson’s account did; rather, all that is required of the laws is that 
they draw a distinction between the nomologically possible and impossible. For that 
task, the laws of fundamental physics will do just fine. 
Still, this account of sufficiency overlooks an important issue, since it will in gen-
eral be possible for the events in S to occur jointly with other “inhibiting” events that 
act so as to prevent the occurrence of E. In figure 3, for example, it obviously doesn’t 
follow from the fact that C fires, together with the “neuron laws,” that E will fire 
(for what if A had fired?)6: 
 
                                                 
6 We have often encountered, both in conversation and in print, the view that determinism en-
tails (or even just is) the thesis that the causes of any event guarantee that event’s occurrence. Not so: 
for even under determinism, the causes of some event do not guarantee that nothing occurs that 
could prevent those causes from bringing about that event.  Metaphysically Reductive Causation       
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Figure 3 
 
A better idea is to say that S suffices for E just in case, were the events in S to 
occur without any interference, E would occur. If we agree that such interference would 
require the occurrence of at least one other, contemporaneous event, then we can 
simplify, as well as remove any residual taint of nonreductivity: A set S of events oc-
curring at some time t suffices for (later) event E iff, were the events in S the only 
events occurring at t, E would (still) occur. Calling a set minimally sufficient just in 
case it is sufficient, but no proper subset is, we thus arrive at the following updated 
regularity account: C is a cause of E iff C belongs to a set of contemporaneous events 
that is minimally sufficient for E. In the simple form displayed here, it is an attractive 
and useful example of the type. 
§2.2 Counterfactual accounts 
Counterfactual accounts of causation begin with the idea that, when E counter-
factually depends on C (or for short, just “depends”) – when, that is, it is the case 
that if C had not occurred, E would not have occurred – then C must be a cause of 
E. Promoted to a sufficient and necessary condition, that won’t do: it is easy enough to 
have circumstances in which C causes E, even though backup processes would have 
brought about E in C’s absence (as figure 1 already shows). But as a sufficient condi-
tion on causation, it has struck many philosophers as exactly right – and therefore as 
an excellent starting point for a full-blown analysis of causation. Scan the literature 
on causation, and you will find a profusion of such analyses, departing in myriad dif-
ferent directions from this leading idea. We will by no means try to provide a com-
prehensive survey, but will sketch three especially interesting avenues.  
The alert reader may be wondering how an account of counterfactuals can be de-
veloped that does not in some way rely on causal notions. An excellent question, 
which (along with related questions) we defer until §§3.3.2 and 3.3.3. 
§2.2.1  Chains of dependence 
C
E
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A well-known and elegant approach comes from Lewis (1973a), who analyzes 
causation as the ancestral of counterfactual dependence: C causes E just in case there 
is a (possibly empty) set of events {D1, D2, ..., Dn} such that D1 depends on C, D2 
depends on D1, ..., and E depends on Dn.  
Figures 1 and 2 display a natural motivation for this approach. For it is clearly the 
case that C causes E; yet E does not depend on C. So it won’t do simply to identify 
causation with counterfactual dependence. On the other hand, D clearly depends on 
C, and – provided we understand the counterfactual in a certain, specific way – E like-
wise depends on D. What way is that? As non-backtracking. We’ll look in more detail at 
what this amounts to in §3.3.2, but for now we’ll make do with the following idea: In 
constructing the counterfactual situation in which D does not fire (at the given time 
t), we hold fixed the state of D’s surroundings at t. So we hold it fixed that, at t, B 
likewise fails to fire. We do not to reason that if D had not fired, that would have to 
have been because C did not fire, whence B would have fired (hence, so too, E).  
Notice that by taking the ancestral, the chains of dependence approach analyti-
cally guarantees that causation is transitive. 
§2.2.2  Influence 
The second account comes from Lewis’s more recent work (2000, 2004a). In it, 
he replaces the simple relation of dependence with a more complicated relation of 
counterfactual covariation. Very roughly, E counterfactually covaries with C just in case 
(and to the extent that) variation in the manner of C’s occurrence would be followed 
by corresponding variation in the manner of E’s occurrence. The situation in which 
C’s absence would be followed by E’s absence is, Lewis thinks, a kind of limiting 
case. Following Lewis, say that C influences E just in case E counterfactually covaries 
with C to a sufficient extent. (Also following Lewis, we will leave it vague what 
counts as “sufficient”.) Lewis’s proposal is that causation is the ancestral of influ-
ence. 
§2.2.3  De facto dependence 
The third approach, championed by Yablo (2004) and by some advocates of 
“structural equations” (of which more in a moment), identifies causation with what 
Yablo has called “de facto dependence”: E de facto depends on C just in case had C 
not occurred, and had other suitably chosen factors temporally between C and E been 
held fixed, then E would not have occurred. The trick is to say what “suitably cho-
sen” means, and to give clear and systematic truth conditions for this more complex 
kind of counterfactual. We’ll bypass the second of these issues, elaborating briefly on 
the first by considering one simple example of a de facto dependence account.  Metaphysically Reductive Causation       
 
10 
We draw our example from the structural equations literature, partly because struc-
tural equations approaches to causation currently enjoy a fair bit of popularity (see 
for example Woodward 2005 and Pearl 2000). To lay out the example we’ll need to 
digress, in order to explain what is distinctive about the structural equations ap-
proach. Here’s the idea: In order to analyze the causal structure of any situation, we 
must first provide a “causal model” for it. The elements of this model consist of (i) 
variables, (ii) a range of possible values for each of the variables, (iii) a specification, for 
each variable, of which other variables (if any) it immediately functionally depends on, and 
(iv) “structural equations” that describe this dependence. Thus, if the situation we are 
modeling is one in which Suzy throws a rock at a bottle, breaking it, we might con-
struct a simple causal model by assigning a variable to the bottle whose values repre-
sent its different possible states (e.g. broken, fractured, unharmed), and assigning a 
second variable to Suzy’s throw whose values represent the strength of the throw 
(and whether it happens at all). Our model will represent the first variable as func-
tionally depending on the second, according to an equation that says, in effect, that 
the bottle will break (the bottle-variable will take the value ‘broken’) iff Suzy throws 
with a strength above a certain threshold.  
It is an excellent question, inadequately addressed in the literature, precisely what 
principles should guide the construction of a causal model. One could be forgiven 
for suspecting that these principles really require one to figure out what causes what, 
in the situation to be modeled, and then to select variables and functional relation-
ships among them to fit. Never mind. (Though see Hall 2007 for discussion.) Given 
that we are going to be confining ourselves mostly to examples represented by neu-
ron diagrams, it will in general be obvious how to construct an appropriate causal 
model: First, assign a variable to each neuron, which can take on a range of values 
corresponding to each different way that that neuron can fire, reserving one more 
value for the situation in which it does not fire at all. Next, stipulate that each such 
variable immediately functionally depends on the variables for those neurons that 
have a direct “incoming” connection to it, either stimulatory or inhibitory. And fi-
nally, write the functional equations down so as to capture exactly how the various 
possible  firing  patterns  for  the  input  neurons  to  a  given  neuron  will  determine 
whether and how it fires.  
Here is the crucial innovation: with causal model in hand, you are in a position to 
give systematic truth-conditions for a novel sort of counterfactual: namely, one whose an-
tecedent specifies values for arbitrarily many variables. And this expanded set of coun-
terfactuals provides the tools for correspondingly novel analyses of causation. 
Suppose for example that we have a causal model for the events depicted in Fig-
ure 1.  Metaphysically Reductive Causation       
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Figure 1 
 
It’s pretty clear how to use the model to construct a counterfactual situation in which 
C does not fire: Take the actual value of the C-variable (1, for firing) and change it to 
0 (non-firing). Make appropriate adjustments downstream, recalculating the values 
for every variable that depends, either immediately or remotely, on this variable. In 
doing so, do not change the actual value of the A-variable. Result: a situation in which 
the counterfactual value of the D-variable is 0, of the B-variable 1, and of E-variable 
1. In words: if C had not fired, then D would not have fired, but B would have fired, 
and therefore so would E. So far, so good. (And so far, nothing new.) 
Now suppose we want to consider a situation in which C does not fire, but B also 
fails to fire (never mind why). When, as here, the antecedent stipulates the value for 
some “endogenous” variable (i.e., a variable whose value functionally depends on 
other variables explicitly represented in the model), then in constructing the counter-
factual situation we simply ignore those functional equations that would otherwise 
have fixed the value of this variable. (It helps to imagine that the endogenous vari-
able gets tweaked by an outside intervention, that breaks that variable’s connection to 
its input variables – hence the common label “interventionist” for accounts of causa-
tion like the one we are considering.) Thus, we set the value of the C-variable to 0, of 
the A-variable to 1 (its actual value), and the B-variable to 0. We then calculate the 
values for the D- and E-variables according to the appropriate functional equations, 
with the result that the D-variable has the value 0 and the E-variable also has the 
value 0. In words: if C had not fired, and B had (still) not fired, then E would not 
have fired. 
Observe that this counterfactual allows us to say that in a sense, E in Figure 1 does 
depend on C; for in fact B does not fire (the B-variable has the value 0), and if we hold 
this fact fixed, then E depends on C. More generally, it is by means of such counterfac-
tuals that those who pursue a “structural equations” version of a de facto depend-
ence account of causation aim to analyze that relation.  
Here, finally, is one specific proposal, drawn from Hitchcock (2001): Suppose 
that we have two events, C and E, and associated variables C and E. And suppose 
C
E
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that we have some appropriate causal model of the situation in which C and E occur. 
Say that there is a “path” from C to E just in case there is a possibly empty set of 
variables {D1, D2, …, Dn} such that D1 immediately functionally depends on C (and 
possibly other variables; we omit this qualification henceforth), D2 immediately func-
tionally depends on D1, … and E immediately functionally depends on Dn. Now 
(departing slightly from Hitchcock for ease of exposition) suppose that there are one 
or more variables that are not on this path, such that if we hold them fixed at their 
actual values, then E depends on C. More exactly, the counterfactual circumstance 
we represent by setting the C-variable to 0, and holding those other off-path vari-
ables fixed at their actual values, is one in which the E-variable also gets set to 0. 
Then, adopting Hitchcock’s terminology, we can say that the given path from C to E 
is an “active route”. A simple proposal results: C is a cause of E iff there is an active 
route from C to E. For example, in figure 1 the C-D-E route is active, as witness the 
fact that if C had not fired and B had also not fired, then E would not have fired. By 
contrast, there appears to be no active route from A to E: for the only candidate is 
the A-B-E route, and holding fixed any combination of the C- and D-variables fails 
to make it the case that E depends on A.  
This is not the only way to construct a de facto dependence approach, or even a 
structural equations variant thereof. But it will provide an attractively simple illustra-
tion of the approach in the pages ahead; observe in this regard that it is crystal clear 
what constrains the choice of factors to be “held fixed” (at least, modulo the provision 
of an appropriate causal model). The reader is invited to contrast Yablo’s (2004) dis-
cussion of this matter, which is far more intricate. 
§2.3 Probabilistic accounts 
Probabilistic accounts of causation are closely related to counterfactual accounts, 
although more naturally suited to treating causation in the indeterministic domain. 
Consider what each account takes as the central feature of the causal relation: For 
counterfactual accounts, it is that the effect counterfactually depends on the cause; 
for probabilistic accounts, it is that the effect probabilistically depends on the cause – 
that is, the probability that the effect occurs, given that the cause occurs, is higher 
than the probability that the effect occurs, given that the cause does not occur. (For 
sophisticated examples of probabilistic accounts, see Eells 1991, Kvart 2004, and 
Ramachandran 2004.)  
We will have no more to say about probabilistic accounts in this essay. Not be-
cause we consider them unimportant. Rather, we overlook them in part because our 
focus is on causation in the deterministic domain – a domain in which all probabili-
ties are one or zero, making probabilistic relations too crude an instrument for un-Metaphysically Reductive Causation       
 
13 
derstanding causation7 – and in part because the relations between probabilistic and 
counterfactual accounts are so close that problems for one often carry over to the 
other.8 We will give just one illustrative example. In Figure 1, it is obvious that E 
does not depend counterfactually on C, since if C had not occurred, the backup 
process initiated by A would have brought about E. But for exactly the same reason, 
E does not depend probabilistically on C: the probability that E occurs is independ-
ent of whether C occurs (understanding the example now to involve appropriately 
“chancy” neurons). So each account will have to adopt some strategy for circum-
venting this and other kinds of examples. And what one finds when one surveys the 
problem cases is that the available strategies are remarkably similar.  
§2.4 Transference accounts 
The recent literature has seen some interest in accounts of causation according to 
which it essentially involves the transfer of some sort of quantity from cause to effect. 
Typical accounts turn to physics in search of the right quantity. For example, Fair 
(1979) takes it to be energy, while Dowe (2000) and Salmon (1994) allow it to be any 
sort of quantity that is, according to the fundamental physical laws, conserved. Other 
“transference” accounts (as we will call them) are more metaphysical: Ehring (1997), 
for example, takes causation to consist (at least in part) in the transfer of tropes, i.e. 
particularized properties.  
We very much doubt that pure versions of such accounts – ones that contain no 
admixture of ideas borrowed from regularity or counterfactual approaches – have a 
prayer of working: for reasons we’ll review in §3.3.5, it simply won’t fly to identify 
causation with the transfer of some special quantity. Still, it is possible that a fully 
adequate account of causation should incorporate elements of some transference 
account. For example, perhaps the best way to deal with cases of preemption such as 
Figure 1 is first to discern the patterns of transfer of the relevant quantity or quanti-
ties, and then to look at more abstract relations of counterfactual dependence or suf-
ficiency, etc., that these transfers exhibit. Transference accounts also prove very use-
ful as a foil for drawing out a variety of issues having to do with causal relations that 
essentially involve omissions (see chapter 4 of Hall and Paul 2011).  
                                                 
7 This assumes, as is surely appropriate, that the probabilities are understood as objective chances, 
and not identified with or constructed out of subjective credence. 
8 Having said that, causation in the probabilistic domain raises several fascinating puzzles that 
have no obvious analogues in the deterministic domain. These are not puzzles about probabilistic 
accounts per se; but they are interesting enough to deserve close study. See for example Frick 2009, or 
Hall and Paul 2011, ch. 2. Metaphysically Reductive Causation       
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§3 Methodology 
With sketches of some of the most important accounts of causation in hand, it’s 
time to jump into our methodological questions. If all goes well, we’ll emerge with a 
cleaner understanding of what an account of causation ought to be aiming to ac-
complish, and, consequently, a better appreciation of the point of the close, exam-
ples-based kind of analysis that is so common in the literature. 
§3.1 Varieties of analysis 
Suppose a philosopher offers up, as part of some philosophical theory, some bi-
conditional9 “A iff B”. Of course, in typical cases she will really be presenting a 
schema. It might have the form “C is a cause of E iff – ”, or “S knows that p iff – ”, 
of “F is an intrinsic property iff – ”, etc., with the blank filled in in some interesting 
way; we’re all familiar with many examples of the type. What exactly do we expect 
from such a schema? What are the standards of success that our philosopher is trying 
to meet? 
Well, every instance of the schema ought to turn out to be true. But that’s not 
very helpful, for more or less obvious reasons. The instances of the biconditional 
might be true but uninformative (“C is a cause of E iff C is a cause of E”), or might 
merely happen to be true (as opposed to being true a priori, or true with some kind of 
analytical or metaphysical necessity).10 Even if we are content to say that we expect 
instances of the biconditional to be informative (without saying precisely what this 
means), and that we expect them to hold with some kind of necessity (without saying 
precisely which kind), we are missing further useful distinctions. Here they are. 
§3.1.1  Mere necessary connection 
First, our philosopher might merely be aiming to highlight an interesting, and in 
some sense “necessary”, connection between the two sides of her biconditional – 
without claiming, further, that either side can in any sense be “explained away” in 
terms of the other. Example: many philosophers find it plausible that property F is 
intrinsic just in case, for any two possible objects x and y that are perfect duplicates of 
each other, either both have F or neither has F. Someone might offer this bicondi-
tional as a moderately informative, useful connection between intrinsicness, duplica-
tion, and modality – without any aspiration to turn it into a reductive analysis or 
definition of “intrinsic property”. 
                                                 
9 Or maybe, less ambitiously, just a conditional, in one direction or the other.  
10 Though one advantage of working with schemata is that it’s hard to produce one where all of 
its instances just happen to be true. Metaphysically Reductive Causation       
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§3.1.2  Stipulative definition 
Next, our philosopher might be presenting a stipulative definition. In some con-
texts, this move is just fine – e.g., when introducing explicitly technical vocabulary, 
and explaining how it is to be understood. But in other contexts it’s not so fine, es-
pecially if the move is designed merely to allow one to avoid seriously grappling with 
counterexamples. Suppose, for instance, that you have become deeply enamored of a 
simple counterfactual analysis of causation: C is a cause of E iff C and E both occur, 
and if C had not occurred, E would not have occurred. You’re perfectly aware of 
cases of preemption that seem to spell doom for this analysis. (Figure 1 will do.) But 
rather than tinker with your analysis, you decide to offer it up as a stipulative defini-
tion of what you shall henceforth mean by “cause”. Then granted, no one can com-
plain that preemption presents you with a counterexample.11 But all you’ve done is 
force the complaint to be registered in a different mode: Now the worry will be that 
you have drawn a useless distinction (not to mention that you have drawn it using fa-
miliar words in misleading ways) – or, at any rate, that you have overlooked a valuable 
distinction  (viz.,  the  distinction  we  mean  to  be  drawing  by  our  use  of  the  word 
“cause”).  
Having  said  all  this,  it  can  sometimes  be  a  valuable  exercise  to  ask  (non-
rhetorically!), of an analysis that runs afoul of some example, “What would be wrong 
with avoiding the counterexample, simply by treating this analysis as a stipulative 
definition?” We’ll come back to this point below. 
§3.1.3  Conceptual analysis 
Next, our philosopher might offering up a good, old-fashioned conceptual analysis. 
We doubt that there is any clear and widely-agreed upon conception of just what 
conceptual analysis is, or what its standards of success are. We’ll distinguish two op-
tions. First, you might have a Fregean view of concepts, according to which they are 
a kind of abstract object which the mind grasps in having thoughts. Maybe some of 
these concepts are structured, in ways that involve other concepts as constituents. Then 
conceptual analysis could aim to put on display the way in which one concept is con-
structed out of other, more basic concepts. 
We’re going to set this idea aside, as its philosophical presuppositions strike us as 
too implausible. There is an alternative, which is to treat conceptual analysis as a kind 
of project in empirical psychology. Start with the view that concepts are psychological 
                                                 
11 Compare Goodman’s (fictional!) “proof that p”: “Zabludowski has insinuated that my thesis 
that p is false, on the basis of alleged counterexamples. But these so-called ‘counterexamples’ depend 
on construing my thesis that p in a way that it was obviously not intended – for I intended my thesis 
to have no counterexamples. Therefore p.” Metaphysically Reductive Causation       
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structures realized in the brain that enable specific kinds of psychological activity. 
(E.g., an agent who possesses the concept cat is thereby able to have thoughts about 
cats. To possess the concept cat just is to have realized in one’s brain a certain kind 
of structure with certain distinctive functional relationships to the rest of one’s psy-
chological economy, and to the outside world.) Then an analysis of a concept can be 
thought of as a theory of how that concept functions in actual human psychological econo-
mies.  
If a philosopher presents herself as engaged in “conceptual analysis”, it’s a very 
good idea to ask her which of these conceptions of conceptual analysis she has in 
mind, if either. As noted, we don’t find the first, Fregean conception terribly useful. 
The second is another story: there is plenty of worthwhile investigation to be done 
into how humans actually engage in causal reasoning. (For a small sampling of recent 
psychological literature, see Gopnik et al. 2004, Lombrozo 2010, Sloman 2005, Wolff 
2007.) But there is also a glaring question as to what exactly armchair philosophical 
speculation has to contribute to such an investigation. A reasonable answer (one that 
many  psychologists  themselves  would  happily  accept):  Armchair  speculation  can, 
done with sufficient care and creativity, generate hypotheses worth testing against 
empirical psychological data.12 Still, it’s safe to say that the more success psychology 
achieves at uncovering the structure of such reasoning, the less such work there will 
be for philosophers. 
There is another role for empirical psychology in a very different kind of phi-
losophical project; one involving ontological reduction. We’ll come back to it below. 
§3.1.4  Ontological reduction 
The fourth kind of analysis our philosopher might be presenting is an ontological 
reduction of causation. That is, she might be intending that one side of her bicondi-
tional puts on display how facts about what causes what reduce to ontologically more 
basic facts. We’ll spend the most time exploring this option. 
As a helpful illustration, forget about causation for the moment, and focus on the 
direction of time. Suppose we take as ontologically fundamental relations of temporal be-
tweenness. That is, we are not looking to analyze “time t1 is between time t2 and time 
t3”. But we are looking to analyze “time t1 is earlier than time t2”. What’s more, we 
seek analysis-as-ontological reduction, in that we think that what it is for one time to 
be earlier than another can be explained in more ontologically basic terms. Then here 
is an ontological reduction that many have found attractive (see for example Albert 
                                                 
12 See for example Lombrozo 2010. Metaphysically Reductive Causation       
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2000): First, we hold that our universe has one low-entropy temporal end.13 Then we 
hold that, in the temporal direction that proceeds away from this end, global entropy 
always increases.14 And now we can say: time t1 is earlier than time t2 iff t2 lies, rela-
tive to t1, in the direction of global entropy increase. 
There are a few things to notice about this example. 
First, our biconditional doesn’t carry reductive intent on its face, even if we add 
“it is necessary that” to the front of it. Suppose you think that it’s just a primitive 
metaphysical fact what the direction of time is (cf. Maudlin 2007c). You might agree 
to the biconditional all the same – you will just take it to state a substantive fact 
about entropy (namely, that it globally increases toward the future). You might even think 
this fact is related to other facts so deep that, while it is strictly speaking nomologi-
cally possible for global entropy to decrease toward the future, this is so objectively 
unlikely as to be deemed impossible, for all practical purposes. So if, by contrast, you 
view the biconditional as laying out how facts about the past/future direction are 
reducible to other, more basic physical facts, then you should just say so explicitly – 
and not try to pretend that your intent can be adequately captured by insisting that 
the biconditional holds with some kind of necessity.15 
Second, it’s actually not so clear what kind of necessity should attach to this bi-
conditional. To be sure, you might claim that, as a matter of metaphysical necessity, one 
time is earlier than another iff it lies in the direction of lower global entropy. But you 
don’t have to claim any such thing. You might insist only that the biconditional holds 
in all possible worlds with laws of nature that allow for facts about entropy. Or you 
might be suspicious of the very notion of metaphysical possibility, as distinct from 
nomological possibility, and be willing only to say that it could have turned out (but 
didn’t) that the past/future asymmetry was not grounded in the direction of global 
entropy increase.  
The issues here – about how exactly to understand metaphysical necessity, and 
its relation to ontological reduction – are subtle, and obviously we don’t pretend to 
have settled them. But we insist – and this, really, is the important point – that it is 
not an effective dialectical maneuver against a proposed ontological reduction merely 
to devise a conceivable scenario that violates it. Imagine the following conversation: 
                                                 
13 Equipped with a notion of temporal betweenness, we can easily say what it is for one time to 
be a temporal end: it is not between any other two times. 
14 Or: sometimes increases and never decreases. Or maybe we get fancier still, and allow for very 
short-lived, occasional decreases, so long as the general trend is toward increasing. 
15 Which is not to say that it doesn’t. It’s just that it seems to us more accurate to say that you take 
the biconditional to be necessary because you take it to describe a relation of ontological reduction, and 
not that you take it to describe a relation of ontological reduction because you take it to be necessary. Metaphysically Reductive Causation       
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Suzy: I think that the direction of time reduces to the direction of entropy in-
crease; what it is for one time to precede another is for the second time to reside, rela-
tive to the first, in the direction of entropy increase. 
Billy: But that can’t be. For it is surely conceivable that entropy decreases toward 
the future. And what is conceivable is metaphysically possible. And if you are right 
that temporal direction is reducible to the direction of entropy increase, then this 
must be so necessarily – which it is not. So your view stands refuted. 
Suzy: No, it doesn’t. 
(Pause.) 
We side with Suzy.16 In fact, this is one of those cases where dodging an appar-
ent counterexample by means of stipulative definition can be a very helpful tactic. 
That is, what Suzy should go on to say is this:  
 
Suzy: “I’m not giving an account of what you mean by ‘the direction of time’. But 
I stipulate that this is what I shall mean by that expression so that I can go on to de-
velop an account of the metaphysical nature of the direction of time. And I now 
challenge you to show why, by doing so, I’m making any sort of serious mistake, or 
missing something of importance.”  
 
If, in reply, the only things Billy can point to are off-the-cuff intuitions about 
outré cases, then Suzy should remain unimpressed.  
Third, there is really no hope of viewing this reduction of facts about past and 
future to facts about entropy as conceptual analysis – at least, not of the second, psy-
chological type, and plausibly not of the first, Fregean type either. It is striking that 
this fact does not impugn the philosophical interest of the analysis in the slightest.  
Fourth, there may still be a role – albeit indirect – for empirical psychology in 
this sort of analysis. Our ordinary temporal concepts have a certain structure. It’s the 
job of empirical psychology to articulate that structure. Not every aspect of that 
structure needs to be mirrored in, or even consistent with, Suzy’s account of tempo-
ral direction. (Again, she’s just not in the business of conceptual analysis.) But: It 
should be possible for her to explain, by means of her account, what sorts of objective 
temporal structures out there in the world our ordinary concepts are answerable to. 
Given how the world is, according to her, actually temporally structured, how is it that 
                                                 
16 In saying this, we’re obviously denying the conjunction of views that (i) conceivability is a 
guide to metaphysical possibility (contra for example Chalmers 2002), and (ii) reductive analyses of 
the kind Suzy is offering here hold must be metaphysically necessary, if true. Metaphysically Reductive Causation       
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our ordinary ways of conceptualizing temporal structure work as well as they do? She 
ought, at least at the end of the day, to be able to say. And successful empirical psy-
chological inquiry into the nature of our ordinary temporal concepts is essential, if 
we are to see what this explanatory demand placed upon her account amounts to. 
Finally, the clarity and interest of the example ought to help allay fears about the 
philosophical coherence or legitimacy of talk of “ontological reduction”. It’s per-
fectly reasonable to wonder what exactly is going on when a philosopher announces 
that what it is for such-and-such a fact to obtain is for such-and-such other fact to 
obtain; or (equivalently, in our view) that this fact holds in virtue of that fact, etc. We’ll 
happily  go  further:  it’s  perfectly  reasonable  to  be  on  one’s  guard  against  overly 
sloppy, cavalier, or mystifying appeals to such notions of ontological “grounding”. 
But caution should not give way to wholesale rejection of the kind of metaphysical 
inquiry that seeks substantive, illuminating answers to questions of the form “What 
is it for such-and-such fact to obtain?” We have a good enough collective grip on the 
distinction  between  more  and  less  ontologically  fundamental  facts  to  be  able  to 
evaluate proposed answers to such questions with respect to how substantive and 
illuminating they are. Part of the reason for highlighting philosophical positions such 
as the foregoing one about the direction of time is precisely to remind ourselves, by 
means of a vivid example, that we do indeed understand what is being asked by a 
question such as “What is it for one time to be earlier than another?” and can indeed 
recognize a substantive and illuminating answer when we see one. And we can rec-
ognize this despite the fact that we may have no explicit theory of the “in virtue of” 
relation. 
Now for the punch line: In the case of causation, we propose that what is of 
primary interest is whether a philosophical account of causation, understood as an onto-
logical reduction, can be given, and if so, what are the plausible forms it might take. 
§3.1.5  Some bad habits to avoid 
With this aim in mind, we can see the importance of guarding against two sorts 
of bad habits. The first is to make assumptions about a test case implicitly grounded 
in knowledge of the causal structure of that case. We’ll give an extended example. 
Late preemption is a particularly thorny kind of causal preemption. Suzy and Billy 
both throw rocks at a bottle, with perfect accuracy; but Suzy’s rock gets there first, 
shattering it. If Suzy hadn’t thrown, the bottle still would have shattered. So a simple 
counterfactual analysis of causation fails in this case, as does Lewis’s “chains of de-
pendence” account, and, arguably, his “influence” account. (See Hall and Paul 2011, 
ch. 3.) Now, Yablo, in arguing for the advantages of his de facto dependence ac-
count, claims that it can easily handle this sort of account: holding fixed the fact that 
Billy’s rock did not strike the bottle, its breaking depends on Suzy’s throw. But why be-Metaphysically Reductive Causation       
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lieve that? Why assume, that is, that the counterfactual “If Suzy had not thrown, and 
if Billy’s rock had (still) not struck the bottle, the bottle would not have broken” is 
true?  Yablo  offers  no  account  of  the  truth-conditions  of  this  counterfactual  that 
yields this verdict; he simply takes its truth as intuitively obvious.  
That’s a mistake. To see why, try working out the truth-conditions: in the coun-
terfactual situation that begins with Suzy not throwing, make some additional small 
change to the world so that Billy’s rock fails to strike the bottle. (For more on the 
truth-conditions of counterfactuals, see §§3.3.2 and 3.3.4, below.) Alas, there are ever 
so many ways to do that – and some perfectly reasonable ways have the result that 
the bottle does shatter. Suppose, for example, that the bottle is perched on a post. 
Then one way it could come about that Suzy does not throw, that Billy does throw, 
and that Billy’s rock somehow fails to strike the bottle, is for a gust of wind to knock 
the bottle off the post – in which case, fragile thing that it is, it shatters upon hitting 
the ground.  
If we could make free use of causal facts about this case, then we could plausibly 
provide a successful recipe for constructing the relevant counterfactual situation, as 
follows: First, identify all the causes of the bottle-shattering; distinguish these from 
other factors that are non-causes. Next, construct a counterfactual situation in which 
Suzy does not throw, Billy throws, but in which other forces are introduced—let us 
provide them with the convenient label “God”—that cause the factors to be held 
fixed to obtain, without in any way interfering with any of the processes that are, in actual fact, 
causally involved in the bottle-shattering. So we allow God to do whatever it takes to Billy’s 
rock to make it the case that it does not hit the bottle, as long as these interventions 
do not causally interact with the bottle itself.  
We do not know why Yablo thinks it intuitively obvious that the counterfactual 
has the truth-conditions he needs it to have. But we speculate that it seems to only 
because he’s holding the actual causal structure of the situation in the back of his 
mind, and letting this structure inform the way he understands the counterfactual 
(perhaps in the manner suggested in the last paragraph). No fair. Absent a proper 
account of the counterfactual’s truth-conditions, he can’t lean on a mere intuition that 
the it comes out true – not in the face of such reasonable suspicion about the intui-
tion’s credentials. 
The example is instructive, for it can easily happen that an account of causation 
leans heavily on some assumption not explicitly about causation – maybe it’s about 
the truth-value of some conditional, or the identity conditions for some event, or 
something else – but where, on inspection, there’s no obvious way to vindicate that 
assumption without appealing to the very causal facts the account is meant to treat. Metaphysically Reductive Causation       
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Such assumptions need to be exposed, for they threaten the viability of any account 
that claims to give reductive conditions for causation.  
The second sort of bad habit involves the misuse of “pragmatics” in defending 
an account of causation. One perfectly justifiable move is familiar from Mackie (1965), 
where we gloss certain events or other feature of a case as part of the background 
context. Lightning strikes a barn, causing a fire. It seems perfectly right, in typical 
contexts, to call the lightning a cause of the fire, and label the presence of oxygen a 
mere “background condition”. Of course, if we changed the explanatory context, say 
to one where a middle school science teacher is lecturing her students on how com-
bustion occurs, it could be perfectly right to say that the presence of oxygen was a 
cause of the fire. The change in context moves an event from the background into 
the foreground, hence changing what counts as an appropriate or correct causal ex-
planation of the case.  
But while changing contexts can change what we should mention in an explana-
tion, it does not change the basic causal facts. In our example of the fire, no matter 
what the context, the domain of causal facts includes all the causal facts (e.g., the fact 
that presence of oxygen is among the causes of the fire), whether or not it is always 
explanatory or contextually appropriate to refer to some of these facts.  
That sort of benign appeal to pragmatics, however, must not be conflated with a 
much more controversial appeal, one which takes pragmatics to somehow apply to 
ontology itself. Consider this passage from Pearl and Halpern (2005), where they 
suggest that facts about what causes what are themselves model-relative: 
According to our definition, the truth of every claim must be evalu-
ated relative to a particular model of the world; that is, our definition 
allows us to claim only that C causes E in a (particular context in a) 
particular structural model. It is possible to construct two closely re-
lated structural models such that C causes E in one and C does not 
cause E in the other. Among other things, the modeler must decide 
which variables (events) to reason about and which to leave in the 
background. We view this as a feature of our model, not a bug. It 
moves the question of actual causality to the right arena—debating 
which of two (or more) models of the world is a better representation 
of those aspects of the world that one wishes to capture and reason 
about.  
The passage suggests two very different ideas – and given the paper’s unclarity 
about just what the “aspects of the world” are that structural models aim to “cap-
ture”, it’s impossible to tell which is in play. One idea – a little surprising, maybe, but 
all the same quite compatible with the reductionist perspective we’re exploring – is Metaphysically Reductive Causation       
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that there is a perfectly objective causal structure in the world that models need to be 
faithful to, but that a typical model will only partially represent this structure; what’s 
more, what is called “causation” in ordinary (and perhaps even scientific) contexts 
depends on which aspects of the underlying structure are being highlighted by one’s 
choice of model. That’s of a piece with the familiar point that we sometimes, for 
pragmatic reasons, relegate causes to the status of “background conditions”. But the 
second idea is far more radical: it is that what the world’s causal structure is is somehow 
relative to one’s choice of model – which choice is, evidently, to be made on broadly 
pragmatic grounds, as witness the reference to “those aspects of the world that one 
wishes to capture and reason about”.  
Whether or not that view is coherent, it’s not compatible with pursuing an onto-
logical reduction. What’s more, it is clearly a mistake to think that approaches to cau-
sation that relativize causal structure to a choice of model could have widespread 
application in the natural or social sciences, or indeed, in legal or historical narratives 
that take themselves to be making factive causal claims. To look at an example, con-
sider recent sociological research suggesting that female applicants whose personal 
details indicate that they have children are less likely to be offered job interviews, are 
ranked lower in competence, and are held to a stricter performance standard than 
male applicants with identical applications (Correll, Benard and Paik 2007). How is it 
helpful to be told that whether, in fact, being a female-with-children is a cause of 
such discrimination depends on one’s choice of model? The obvious retort is that, 
well, we would like to choose that model which gets the causal structure right. But on the 
second, more radical interpretation of what Pearl and Halpern are up to, there is no 
objective causal structure to get right. That won’t do. Being able to make objective 
claims about the causal structure of the world is just too essential to the role actual 
causal models play in science, and to the ways science is drawn upon, e.g., to develop 
or encourage governmental and corporate policy. 
What we’ll take up next are the rules we think should be followed in constructing 
an ontological reduction of causation to more metaphysically basic facts. 
§3.2 The Book of Rules 
We describe five of the most important rules. 
§3.2.1  Rule one: Thou shalt not smuggle the causal in with the basic. 
A traditional conceptual analysis of causation cannot make use of explicitly causal 
concepts, such as the concept of “intervention” or “manipulation”. In a similar fash-
ion, we cannot successfully reduce causal facts to ontologically more basic facts if 
those facts include causal facts. This is obvious. It should be equally obvious that one Metaphysically Reductive Causation       
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cannot use in one’s account notions or facts that are merely implicitly or indirectly 
causal.  
Transgressions of this rule can be subtle. Suppose you think that causal facts are 
to be analyzed, in Davidsonian fashion, as instances of “covering” laws. Does your 
analysis need, in order to be extensionally adequate, a distinction between causal and 
non-causal laws? If so, it violates rule one. Or suppose that your analysis makes use of 
counterfactuals – but you turn around and give these causal truth-conditions. We’ll 
periodically have occasion, in what follows, to highlight points at which an account 
undercuts its reductive aspirations in just this way. 
§3.2.2  Rule two: Thou shalt not be metaphysically extravagant. 
You can undercut the explanatory value of your account of causation by charac-
terizing the ontologically basic facts that serve as its ingredients in too metaphysically 
extravagant a fashion. Example: Suppose your account accommodates causation by 
omission. But it does so in part by positing a special kind of “negative” event in Me-
inongian style. Thus, when Billy’s failure to water Suzy’s plants causes their death, 
that is in virtue of a relation between one such negative event – Billy’s failure to wa-
ter the plants – and another, more prosaic event (the plants’ death). Negative events 
must not, you insist, be identified with ordinary, “positive” events. You proceed to 
construct a Grand Metaphysical Theory of them, in order to answer such questions 
as these: Where do they take place? How long do they last? When are they identical 
to or distinct from one another? What are their parts? 
Regardless of how clever you are in constructing your theory, something has 
gone wrong. We started with something metaphysically prosaic, and ended up trying 
to illuminate its nature by appeal to something else that is far too metaphysically ex-
travagant. Now, what counts as metaphysical extravagance is to some extent relative to 
a domain of enquiry and to some extent a matter of taste. Still, we think that in the 
context of contemporary discussions of causation, the standards are reasonably high. 
Here is a good rule of thumb: the basic ontology needed for causation should not 
exceed that needed for the fundamental truths of physics. This rule of thumb strikes 
us as especially appropriate, given that one of the aims of an ontological reduction of 
causation is to produce something useful to, and illuminating of, scientific practice. 
(But don’t misunderstand us: there might be quite a lot of basic ontology needed for 
the fundamental truths of physics.) As we’ll see, even with this relatively generous 
interpretation of the rule, we’ll come across several examples of accounts that fail to 
apply it appropriately. 
§3.2.3  Rule three: Thou shalt not rely upon explanatorily idle notions. Metaphysically Reductive Causation       
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A notion is idle in our sense if, in order to reduce or to fully explicate it, one 
would have to appeal to machinery that would already suffice to analyze causation, 
without any detour through the notion in question. We’ll draw on Davidson again 
for an example. Suppose you think that what it is for C to be a cause of E is for there 
to be some law that “covers” C and E, under suitably chosen descriptions. C is an F-
event, E is a G-event, and E is R-related to C; and there is a law that says that every 
F-event is followed by a G-event R-related to it: that is the kind of “coverage” that 
your account takes to be necessary and sufficient for causation. Fine. But the “law” 
in  question  is  almost  certainly  not  a  law  of  fundamental  physics.  (Suzy’s  throw 
caused the bottle to break. What was the “covering” law? Presumably, something like 
this: every throw in such-and-such circumstances is followed by a breaking with 
such-and-such features. That’s not a law of fundamental physics.) So you will, at the 
end of the day, need some account of what it is for this kind of “higher-level law” to 
obtain. Imagine that you provide an account in terms of certain kinds of counterfac-
tuals – and that it is clear on inspection that you could have applied those counter-
factuals directly to the analysis of causation. Then you will have broken rule three. 
§3.2.4  Rule four: Thou shalt not be an ontological commitment wimp. 
One way to avoid breaking any of the foregoing rules is to say very little. If onto-
logical reduction is genuinely one’s aim (as opposed, say, to mere necessary connec-
tion; see §3.1.1), then all one gains by saying very little are gains of theft over honest 
toil.  
There is a straightforward way not to be an ontological wimp: show, explicitly, 
how facts about causation are grounded in facts about fundamental physical states, 
together with facts about the fundamental physical laws governing their evolution. 
Granted, that’s a tall order. But keeping it firmly in mind, if only as an ideal, helps 
guard against the overly cavalier use of unexplained concepts that we will occasion-
ally witness in the accounts we will discuss. 
There is a second way to be a wimp about ontological commitments: appeal, in 
one’s reduction, to facts too specific to our own world. Now, we need to be a little 
careful here. It’s not that we think an account needs to be in the business of issuing 
verdicts about any old conceivable situation some philosopher can cook up. The lit-
erature (including some of our own contributions!) occasionally likes to speculate 
about the causal structure of worlds in which magical spells can act across a temporal 
gap, or in which there is backwards causation, etc.; part of the lesson of the little case 
study concerning the direction of time rehearsed in §3.1.4 was to remind us that it’s 
far from obligatory for an ontological reduction to extend its scope so far. So a high-
quality account that cannot, alas, say anything coherent about backwards causation 
and other esoterica should not, for that reason, lose our respect. Still, causation is a Metaphysically Reductive Causation       
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generic enough relation (and our corresponding concept of it is broad enough) that 
tying a theory of it too closely to facts peculiar to our actual world, and its physics, 
manifests a failure of nerve. Accounts that do that should lose our respect. 
§3.2.5  Rule five: Thou shalt not take thine own intuitions too seriously. 
Suppose  you  are  interested  in  what  grounds  the  direction  of  time.  Someone 
comes along, insisting that it cannot be grounded in the direction of global entropy 
increase, because such a view fails to do justice to their intuitive conviction that time 
genuinely passes. Or suppose you’re curious about what it is for an object to be solid. 
Someone comes along, insisting that there are in fact no solid objects, since atomic 
theory shows that most of the things we mistakenly take to be solid are composed 
largely of empty space – and it is intuitively clear that if an object is solid and occupies 
a certain region R of space, than for any subregion of R, some part of that object 
occupies that subregion. What should you think? 
 In both cases, you should think that intuition has been set up as an arbiter of 
questions it is not competent to judge. Granted: when investigating some aspect of 
the ontological structure of the world, it is hugely important to pay attention to ordi-
nary intuitions as a valuable source of clues for where to look. But the process of 
theorizing can yield ample opportunities for rejecting some of these intuitions as 
misguided (though it will help, if we can supplement the theory in question with an 
explanation for why we were so easily led astray). This methodological point is blind-
ingly obvious in the case of the direction of time, or the nature of solidity. Thank-
fully, the literature on causation is beginning to incorporate it as well. It is no longer 
so acceptable to claim, with Lewis (1986b), that “If an analysis of causation does not 
deliver the common-sense answer, that is bad trouble.” In sum: while you should 
certainly worry that your analysis has missed something important if it flouts some 
clear and firmly held intuition, you should not hastily assume that your analysis has 
been refuted. 
§3.3 The accounts reconsidered 
We’re now in a good position to reconsider the accounts sketched in §2. We’ll 
highlight the most important issues. 
§3.3.1  Regularity accounts and laws of nature 
Recall that we distinguished two varieties of regularity account. One takes as its 
key idea that for C to cause E is for these events to be covered (perhaps under appro-
priate descriptions) by a suitable law. The other says that C must belong to a set of 
conditions minimally sufficient for E. The second idea brings laws in only indirectly, Metaphysically Reductive Causation       
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to say what “sufficient” means. And, as we saw, the laws brought in can simply be 
the laws of fundamental physics.  
What about the first idea? A dilemma confronts it. Maybe the covering laws are 
supposed to be fundamental laws. But these laws relate, in the first instance, complete 
physical states of the world to subsequent complete physical states. We will search in 
vain among them for laws that will explicitly “cover” any but an exceedingly narrow 
range of causal phenomena. Suzy throws a rock at a bottle, shattering it; are we to 
suppose that there is some way of describing her throw and the shattering such that, 
relative to these descriptions, the relation between the two events can be seen as an 
instance of some fundamental law? On the other hand, maybe the laws are the far-
from-fundamental laws of the special sciences. But then the account will almost cer-
tainly flout one or more of our rules. It might flout rule one by taking the “laws” 
simply to be certain kinds of causal generalizations. Or rule two, by treating them as 
sui generis, and irreducible to more basic physical laws. (Cartwright 1999 seems to 
have a view that is something like this.) Or rule three, by analyzing these laws in 
counterfactual terms themselves adequate to analyze causation. Or rule four, by say-
ing nothing about what these laws come to (Maudlin 2004, though in other respects 
quite brilliant, is an example).  
We think the best way to avoid the dilemma is to abjure the style of regularity ac-
count that gives rise to it; that is why we favor, as a more interesting and fruitful ap-
proach, the second of the two ideas sketched in §2.1. 
§3.3.2  Truth conditions of counterfactuals 
A successful account of causation cashed out in terms of counterfactuals needs a 
successful  account  of  counterfactuals,  one  not  itself  cashed  out  in  causal  terms. 
(Note that this point applies not merely to the accounts sketched in §2.2, but also to 
the “updated regularity account” sketched in §2.1.) So not all counterfactual treat-
ments of causation will be suitable candidates for an ontological reduction. (For ex-
ample, Woodward’s 2005 nonreductive approach will not meet these standards.) One 
might think that there is not far to look – Lewis’s oft-cited 1979 analysis aims to 
provide just what we need. But there are serious problems with Lewis’s view. 
Recall what Lewis’s analysis says about a simple counterfactual of the form “if 
event C had not occurred, then event E would not have occurred”. Assuming that C 
and E in fact occur, we evaluate this counterfactual by moving to a possible world 
with the following features: Up until shortly before the time of C’s occurrence, its 
history is perfectly qualitatively identical to the actual history. And then a “miracle” oc-
curs – a violation of the actual fundamental laws of nature (though, obviously, not a 
violation of the laws that hold in the counterfactual world itself). Post-miracle history 
unfolds perfectly in accordance with the actual laws. The miracle should be as small Metaphysically Reductive Causation       
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and as inconspicuous as possible, subject to the requirement that it throws history 
off course enough to make it the case that C does not occur. The counterfactual is 
true, finally, just in case E also fails to occur. 
We think that this is close to the account of the truth conditions for counterfac-
tuals that a philosopher should endorse, who wants to give an ontological reduction 
of causation in terms of counterfactuals. But it’s not quite right, and, more impor-
tantly, the motivations behind it strike us as deeply flawed. To clarify all this, let’s 
look a bit more deeply into what Lewis took himself to be trying to accomplish in 
providing truth conditions for counterfactuals, and why he thought these truth con-
ditions would take the form of the foregoing “small-miracles recipe” for the specific 
sorts of counterfactuals that appear in his analysis of causation. 
Obviously, one of the aims Lewis had was to meet the needs of his counterfac-
tual analysis of causation, and to do so in a suitably reductive manner (so that the 
proffered truth conditions for counterfactuals did not themselves make use of any 
causal notions). But he also took on board, more or less explicitly, three additional 
constraints:  
First, he took it for granted that his truth conditions should be general purpose, and 
not simply tailored to the kinds of counterfactuals needed in his analysis of causa-
tion. Thus, these truth conditions should be able to handle sentences such as “if 
kangaroos had no tails, then they would fall over”, and even “if gravity worked by an 
inverse-cube law, planetary orbits would still sweep out equal areas in equal times”.  
Second, he took for granted that the proposed truth conditions should fit within 
a general framework of similarity semantics for counterfactuals. That is, we start with 
the assumption that the right form for the truth conditions for sentences of the form 
“if A were the case, then B would be the case” (“A  B”, for short) is roughly as fol-
lows: among those possible worlds in which A is true, the one that is most similar to 
the actual world is one in which B is true.17 The project then becomes to articulate 
the specific standards of similarity that our counterfactuals implicitly make use of.  
Third – and rather too ambitiously – Lewis wanted an account of counterfactuals 
that would explain the asymmetry of time, in line with the idea that what distin-
guishes the future as such is that it counterfactually depends on the past, but not vice 
versa. 
Lewis managed to leverage these constraints into a specific standard for similar-
ity, one that, no matter how much one admires the cleverness of its construction, 
                                                 
17We say “roughly” because there are complications if – as will surely typically be the case – there 
is no uniquely most similar A-world. 
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ought also to strike one as hopelessly byzantine. Here it is: In selecting a most similar 
A-world, it is of first importance to avoid large, widespread miracles, of secondary 
importance to maximize the region of exact match of particular facts, of third impor-
tance to avoid small miracles, and of little importance to secure approximate match. 
So the general-purpose truth conditions are simply these: A  B is true just in case, 
among those possible worlds in which A is true, the one that is most similar to the 
actual world according to the foregoing standard is one in which B is true. Lewis argues 
that, from these generic truth-conditions, one can derive the small-miracles recipe 
for evaluating causal counterfactuals. Along the way, we get an argument for why, in 
worlds like ours, the future typically counterfactually depends on the past, but not 
vice versa. 
But however influential, the account is wholly unsatisfactory, for reasons that by 
now are well known. Here are three serious problems. First, Adam Elga has argued 
decisively that given what we know about thermodynamics and statistical mechanics, 
Lewis’s claim to have shown where the asymmetry between past and future comes 
from cannot be sustained. Second, the standard of similarity between worlds that is 
supposed  to  yield  the  small-miracles  recipe  seems  far  too  convoluted  not  to  be 
viewed as ad hoc and arbitrary. Among all the standards of similarity that we might 
have hit upon to govern our use of counterfactual conditionals, what could explain 
our choice of this one? (See Horwich 1993 for a forceful presentation of this objec-
tion.) Third, the small-miracles recipe almost always produces a gap between the 
time of occurrence of the miracle in the counterfactual world, and the time of the 
event in question – in which case there will be counterfactual dependence of the 
immediate past on the present. Woodward (2005) argues persuasively that this there is 
no way to avoid the result that – if counterfactual dependence suffices for causation 
– backwards causation is rampant.  
And anyway, there is another issue to consider: Why should those of us whose 
reductive ambitions are focused squarely on causation – and causation alone – en-
dorse all the elements of the Lewisian semantics? If our first interest is in the pros-
pects for a counterfactual analysis of causation, then the right thing to do is not to 
try to fix Lewis’s account, but rather to abandon it – and more to the point, to aban-
don the pretensions to providing truth conditions for counterfactuals that will simul-
taneously serve the needs of a theory of causation and meet Lewis’s additional con-
straints. It should not be thought that abandoning these pretensions comes at any 
cost, or is any occasion for disappointment. Remember that what we are aiming at is 
ontological reduction. We are not trying to uncover the structure of our ordinary 
concept of causation (except insofar as doing so provides us clues as to where inter-
esting ontological reductions might be found), nor are we trying to uncover the con-Metaphysically Reductive Causation       
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nections between this concept and our ordinary concept of counterfactual depend-
ence. So we can, with a perfectly clear philosophical conscience, look for an account 
of the truth conditions of counterfactuals that tries to do nothing more than give us 
a useful tool in the construction of an account of causation. And once we limit our 
focus in this way, the needed account is not hard to find. 
Here is the simple alternative to Lewis’s account (adapted from Maudlin 2007b) 
that we have in mind. Suppose event C occurs at t, and event E occurs later. To 
evaluate “if C had not occurred, then E would not have occurred”, we construct a 
counterfactual state of the world at time t as much like the actual state at time t as 
possible, save for the fact that C does not occur. Think of taking the actual time-t 
state of the world, and ringing carefully localized changes on it just sufficient to make 
it the case that C does not occur. (An important refinement of this procedure will 
appear shortly.) We then evolve the resulting state forward, in accordance with the 
actual laws of nature. If the resulting history yields E, the conditional is false; other-
wise it is true. That’s the recipe – tailored, as you can see, to the kinds of counterfac-
tuals needed in a theory of causation.18 We don’t try to display this recipe as an in-
stance of some more general prescription for evaluating counterfactuals. Similarity 
enters in not as a relation between whole worlds, but as a relation between states of 
worlds at times. We don’t try to get to the counterfactual state in which C fails to oc-
cur by way of some miracle that throws history off course – in fact, we don’t care 
one whit where this state came from. (Thinking in terms of such history-altering 
miracles might be a psychologically useful method for fixing attention on the appro-
                                                 
18 Note that there is an issue here derived from statistical mechanics that we are overlooking. 
Consider a simple example. A gas is confined by a barrier to one half of a chamber, the other half of 
which contains a vacuum. Suppose we ask what would have happened if, at time t, the barrier had 
been removed. We would like to say that the gas would have diffused across to the other side of the 
chamber. And our recipe seems to guarantee this result: we construct a counterfactual state of the 
world at time t which is just like the actual state, save that the barrier is absent; evolving this state for-
ward in time would seem to yield a future in which the gas diffuses. But that is not quite right. The 
more accurate picture is really this: There is not one single counterfactual t-state that meets our condi-
tions, but rather a continuous infinity of such states, differing in minute and seemingly insignificant 
microphysical respects (in one, a certain gas molecule is moving with just this velocity; in another, it is 
moving with a slightly different velocity; etc.). But some of those states will be bizarre anti-entropic 
states, that yield forward evolutions in which the gas stays on one side of the partition. We know, on 
statistical mechanical grounds, that these bizarre states make up an astronomically tiny minority of all 
of the relevant counterfactual states. But we also know that they exist. So what we should really say is 
this: if the partition had been absent at time t, then, with a statistical probability vanishingly close to 
but not exactly equal to 1, the gas would have diffused across to the other side of the chamber. We 
will take it for granted henceforth that counterfactuals like this are good enough for the purposes of 
an ontological reduction of causation. 
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priate counterfactual state; to this extent, the attractiveness of the small-miracles rec-
ipe makes sense.) And, finally, we don’t try to squeeze out a story about the direction 
of time from our analysis of counterfactuals.  
This alternative to the Lewis analysis is the one that we will make use of hence-
forth. Let’s see it in action, applied to the example depicted in figure 1: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
At time 0, neurons C and A both fire. To show that E does not depend on C, we 
simply change this time 0 state in a localized way, making neuron C dormant. The 
events that unfold are those depicted in figure 2: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
At time 1, neurons D and B both fire. To show that E in figure 1 does depend on 
D, we simply construct a counterfactual state for time 1 in which neuron D is dor-
mant, and everything else remains the same – so B is not firing, and the neurons are 
still connected together in the way depicted in figures 1 and 2. We simply don’t care 
where this state came from – if you like, imagine that the counterfactual world just 
starts out in this state. It is then clear that the counterfactual state unfolds in such a 
way that E does not fire. What this result illustrates is that our simple alternative rec-
ipe for evaluating counterfactuals has the “non-backtracking” feature that, as we saw 
C
E
D
B A
C
E
D
B AMetaphysically Reductive Causation       
 
31 
back in §2.2.1, it needs to have in order to have a chance of undergirding a successful 
account of causation. 
§3.3.3  Default and deviant states 
We have one more serious issue to deal with, one that will likely arise for any ac-
count of counterfactuals. (It certainly arises both for Lewis’s miracles-based recipe, 
and for our own “altered states” recipe.) Even the simplest of examples illustrates it. 
Suzy throws a rock at noon, breaking a bottle. It is utterly natural – and surely cor-
rect – to hold that if she hadn’t thrown the rock, the bottle would not have broken 
(for remember that this is not one of those tricky cases in which some backup proc-
ess aims to break the bottle as well). But then we must be supposing that, in the rele-
vant counterfactual situation in which Suzy is not, at noon, throwing a rock at the 
bottle, she is not doing anything else that would lead to a bottle-breaking: she is not 
starting to run up towards the bottle to level a kick at it; she’s not throwing some 
other object at it; she’s not shooting her slingshot at it; etc.  
Neither the small-miracles recipe that Lewis favors, nor the altered-states recipe 
we favor, automatically secures this result. Our own recipe instructs us to construct a 
counterfactual state of the world at noon by taking the actual state, and locally modi-
fying it so that Suzy does not throw a rock. But – given the vast multitude of ways 
she could turn out to not be throwing a rock – these instructions underspecify what 
she is doing instead. It would be foolish to appeal to similarity here, as if the right way 
to proceed is to have her do something very much like throwing a rock. The small-
miracles recipe is, if anything, in even worse shape. Suppose that, shortly before 
noon, Suzy is deliberating about the best way to break the bottle. In fact, she settles 
on throwing a rock, rather than firing her slingshot (her second choice). If that is 
how things play out, then the smallest, most inconspicuous miracle that will throw 
history off course just enough to get her not to throw her rock will consist in a few 
subtle alterations of the neural underpinnings of her deliberations, alterations that 
lead her to fire her slingshot instead. So whereas our altered-states recipe wasn’t 
fleshed out enough to yield a determinate result, Lewis’s small-miracles recipe is 
sometimes guaranteed to yield the wrong result. 
This problem has been noticed before – for example, by Lewis himself. Here’s a 
pithy expression of it:  
 
What is the closest way to actuality for C not to occur? – It is for C to be replaced 
by a very similar event, one which is almost but not quite C, one that is just barely 
over the border that divides versions of C itself from its nearest alternatives. But if 
C is taken to be fairly fragile [i.e., characterized by stringent conditions of occur-
rence], then if C had not occurred and almost-C had occurred instead, very likely 
the effects of almost-C would have been much the same as the actual effects of C. Metaphysically Reductive Causation       
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So our causal counterfactual will not mean what we thought it meant, and it may 
well not have the truth value we thought it had. When asked to suppose counter-
factually that C does not occur, we don’t really look for the very closest possible 
world where C’s conditions of occurrence are not quite satisfied. Rather, we imag-
ine that C is completely and cleanly excised from history, leaving behind no fragment or 
approximation of itself. (Lewis 2004a, p. 90; italics added) 
 
We think Lewis’s observations are right on target – up to the italicized portion, at 
which point they become mysterious. What exactly does such “complete and clean 
excision” consist in? Removal of the event by some sort of metaphysical scalpel? 
Leaving behind … what? The Void? (We should also note that it is unclear how 
Lewis’s approach fits with his theory of event essences and causation in his 1986c.) 
A much better view is that for any given event, we work with an antecedently 
understood distinction between a default state for the region in which the event oc-
curs, or for the physical system or systems to which it pertains. Conceiving of the 
event as one among various possible deviations from that default state, we answer the 
question, “What would have happened, had that event not occurred?” by returning 
the relevant region or system to its default state, holding the state of everything else 
fixed. It is in this way – and not by metaphysical surgery – that we can fill in the al-
tered-states recipe for evaluating counterfactuals. Thus, the counterfactual noon-state 
we have in mind in the world where Suzy does not throw her rock is one in which 
she is standing idle, doing nothing. 
We strongly suspect that any ontological reduction of causation that makes use 
of counterfactuals will need to deploy some distinction between default states and 
deviations  thereof.  That  seems  obvious  in  the  case  of  Lewis’s  original  analysis, 
though perhaps less so in the case of his influence analysis, or de facto dependence 
approaches. The need is even more glaring in the case of the second of our two regu-
larity accounts – which, remember, analyzed what it is for a set of events S, all occur-
ring at time t, to suffice for some later event E by means of the conditional, “if only 
the events in S had occurred at t, then E would still have occurred”. Clearly, under-
standing this conditional requires an understanding of what it comes to for nothing 
else to be happening at the relevant time – which looks to be the same as saying: eve-
rything else is in its default state. 
At any rate, we won’t argue the point further. We simply note that if our suspi-
cion is right, then a major piece of unfinished business for ontological reductions of 
causation that make use of counterfactuals is to provide a supplementary account of 
this distinction. Moreover, such an account needs to respect the reductionist con-
straints we’ve laid out above. This is an area in which, at present, matters are very Metaphysically Reductive Causation       
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much wide open (see Maudlin 2004, Hitchcock 2007, and Hall 2007 for some discus-
sion and attempts to apply a default/deviant distinction).  
One final note. It seems to us that the widespread use of neuron diagrams is 
partly to blame for the fact that philosophical discussions of causation typically over-
look the centrality of the default/deviant distinction. And that is because, in the case 
of neurons, it is so obvious as to escape notice what counts as the relevant default 
state for a neuron: it is just the dormant state.  
§3.3.4  De facto dependence counterfactuals 
So far we have seen that – modulo some lingering and perfectly legitimate con-
cerns about the status of the default/deviant distinction – we have been able to give 
suitably non-causal truth conditions for one important kind of counterfactual. That 
covers a lot of territory. But not all of it. What about the sorts of counterfactuals 
needed in de facto dependence accounts? Recall the general form of these accounts: 
what it is for event C to be a cause of another event E is for it to be the case that, for 
some suitably chosen fact F about the given situation, if C had not occurred but F 
had still obtained, then E would not have occurred. It is challenging to specify how 
the fact to be held fixed gets selected. Let us set that issue aside for now, and focus 
on the question of how, once the fact F has been selected, truth conditions are to be 
given for this counterfactual. 
Everything depends on the form that F takes. If it takes the right form, then 
truth conditions come easily, by way of a natural extension of our altered-states rec-
ipe. But if it takes the wrong form, then it remains entirely too obscure what these 
truth conditions are. We will illustrate these two possibilities by a pair of examples. 
Start with the case where things work well. Consider figure 1 again. Suppose, as 
part of your de facto dependence account, you have identified the fact to be held 
fixed as the fact that neuron B does not fire at time 1. Then it is easy to extend our 
altered-states recipe in a way that allows for the clean evaluation of the conditional 
“if C had not fired at time 0, but B had still failed to fire at time 1, then E would not 
have fired”. We do so as follows: 
First, focus on the actual time-0 state of the world. Locally modify it so as to 
make it the case that C does not fire (i.e., return C to its dormant state). Evolve the 
resulting state forward until time 1. The result is a state in which B is firing. Now 
make local changes to this state, so as to make it the case that B is dormant at time 1 
(i.e., in the same state as it is actually in at that time). Evolve this resulting state for-
ward until time 2. E does not fire. So the conditional is true. 
More generally, if we have a conditional of the form “if C had not occurred, but 
the fact F had still obtained, then E would not have occurred”, and there is a non-
arbitrary way to make the fact F obtain by locally modifying the state of the world at Metaphysically Reductive Causation       
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one or more times, then we can follow the same procedure: modify the state of the 
world at the time at which C in fact occurs so as to make it the case that C does not 
occur; update in accordance with the actual laws; and make localized modifications 
along the way, in a non-arbitrary fashion, so as to guarantee that fact F still obtains. 
If the fact F simply consists in the occurrence or nonoccurrence of specific, localized 
events, then this will in general be straightforward. 
So far, so good. Unfortunately, not every case will be like this. Recall the example 
from §3.1.5, which resists such a clean treatment: Suzy and Billy both throw rocks at 
a bottle, but Suzy’s gets there first, shattering it. If she had not thrown, then Billy’s 
rock would have shattered the bottle a moment later. It is a commonplace among 
fans of the de facto dependence approach to causation to point out that Billy’s rock 
never  in  fact  strikes  the  bottle,  and  to  go  on  to  claim  that  the  conditional  that 
grounds the fact that it is Suzy’s throw that causes the bottle to break is therefore 
this one: if Suzy had not thrown, and Billy’s rock had still somehow failed to strike 
the bottle, then the bottle would not have broken. But we immediately run into 
trouble if we try to analyze this counterfactual in the way just indicated. The fact to 
be held fixed is too indeterminate for us to be able to tell just which state of the 
world to locally modify, so as to guarantee that this fact still obtains in the relevant 
counterfactual situation. Worse: some local modifications will get exactly the wrong 
result – for example, the local modification that puts the bottle into a shattered state 
before Billy’s rock can reach it. 
As yet, there is no appropriately reductive account of the truth-conditions of de 
facto dependence counterfactuals that we know of that deals with this problem.  
§3.3.5  Conserved quantities  
While we treat transference accounts as live options, we want to register two very 
serious complaints. The problems we have in mind are not tied to any particular ex-
ample, but have much more to do with a failure to abide by the methodological pre-
cepts we think should guide philosophical inquiry into causation. 
First, transference accounts seem to suffer from a surprising lack of ambition. 
(Cf. our rule, “thou shalt not be an ontological commitment wimp”.) Even if these 
views correctly describe the actual world, surely there could be worlds with laws that 
don’t single out anything as a “conserved” quantity – more generally, that do not de-
scribe the transfer of anything physically fundamental. Consider, for example, a world 
described in Maudlin (2004) that operates on principles akin to those at work in 
Conway’s game of “Life”: space is divided up into discrete cells, each of which can 
be either occupied or unoccupied; time is divided up into discrete moments; the pat-
tern of occupation of the cells at one moment is lawfully and deterministically fixed 
by the pattern of occupation of the cells at the prior moment. There seem to be Metaphysically Reductive Causation       
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causal relations in such a world, and we are perfectly capable of recognizing them. It 
is a mark against transference accounts that they can have nothing to say about why 
this is so.  
But there is a more serious problem. Let us illustrate it by means of our example 
of Billy, Suzy, and the bottle. Suzy’s throw is a cause of the bottle’s shattering and 
Billy’s is not. Can a transference account illuminate why this is so? You might think 
so. After all, it is Suzy’s rock, and not Billy’s, that transfers momentum or energy to 
the bottle, isn’t it? To wit, consider what Ehring says about such cases: “Causal an-
cestry is determined by the origins of the energy/momentum manifested in the ef-
fect. A preempting cause is distinguishable from a preempted cause in virtue of the 
fact that the energy/momentum of the effect-event is traceable back to the preempt-
ing cause-event, but not to the preempted cause-event” (Ehring 1997, p. 45).  
Such an analysis relies on too soft a focus. Consider that Billy’s rock, as it flies 
through the air, pushes air molecules ahead of it, and that some of these bump into 
the bottle before Suzy’s rock strikes it. We can, for that reason, credit Billy’s throw 
with initiating a process that transfers energy, momentum, or indeed any other can-
didate quantity to the bottle. That is, whatever the stuff is whose transfer to the bot-
tle makes it the case, according to a transference account, that Suzy’s throw causes 
the bottle to break, it seems that we can find that quantity transferred to the bottle 
by Billy’s throw as well. This creates trouble for the transference theorist, whose 
view seems to entail that “[i]f there is a transfer from both the main and the alternate 
lines, then there is simply no preemption, but only two lines of partial contributing 
causes” (Ehring 1997, 45). 
Now, what one obviously wants to say is that whereas Billy’s throw might trans-
fer momentum (for example) to the bottle, it does not transfer enough to make the 
bottle shatter. So the limited amount of momentum Billy’s throw transfers is not suf-
ficient to render it causally relevant to the breaking. That is perfectly correct, but 
what transference accounts fail to do, as far as we can tell, is to provide any illumina-
tion about why it is correct. What’s more, it is fairly obvious where such illumination 
should come from: We might, for example, focus on the fact that the breaking does 
not  counterfactually  depend  on  the  transfer  of  such  a  small  quantity  of  momentum 
(whereas, by contrast, it does depend on the transfer of the larger quantity of momen-
tum that resulted from Suzy’s throw); or we might focus on the fact that the transfer 
of the smaller quantity is not sufficient in the circumstances for the shattering (whereas 
the transfer of a larger quantity is). That is, we would focus on the kinds of relations 
that counterfactual and regularity accounts place at center stage.  
This sort of problem is going to be ubiquitous (unless, perhaps, we choose to re-
strict our attention to causation among the most microphysical events we can find). Metaphysically Reductive Causation       
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It seems to us very likely that transference accounts can have a chance of solving it 
only if they incorporate analytical tools – maybe counterfactual dependence, maybe 
some notion of sufficiency – that can be independently used to provide an account 
of causation. If so, pure transference accounts inevitably violate rule three (“thou 
shalt not rely upon explanatorily idle notions”). 
§4 Concluding remarks 
We hope you share our enthusiasm concerning the value and interest of onto-
logical reductions in general, and of causation in particular. But maybe you don’t. 
That could be because you’re just interested in other parts of philosophy. No wor-
ries. But it could also be because you are laboring under one or another misconcep-
tion. Two such misconception are especially worth exposing. 
The first goes like this: “What the point in continuing to pursue an analysis of 
causation? We’ve been at it, like, forever – and all that’s happened is that ever more 
baroque analyses confront ever more baroque counterexamples. We should give up, 
and do something productive with our time.” 
However common this attitude (in some circles, anyway), it doesn’t sustain criti-
cal scrutiny. To begin, the best of the going analyses are really not that baroque. But 
there’s a deeper confusion, which is that the name of the game ought to be to con-
struct an analysis that successfully runs the gamut of all possible counterexamples. We agree: 
that game isn’t particularly worth playing. (What exactly would you have gained, if 
you succeeded at it?) But we hope that our discussion in this essay has made it pat-
ently  obvious  that  someone  pursuing  an  ontological  reduction  has  very  different 
aims. You can’t completely ignore intuitions about cases, in pursuing these aims. But 
you’re not trying to triangulate to them, either. 
The second misconception is that a successful reductive account of causation 
wouldn’t yield anything of value. Now, we think this complaint can in fact be an-
swered on its own terms: reductive accounts hold great promise in clarifying, for ex-
ample, the relationship between statistical correlation and causation; they also have 
helped clarify the status of “laws” in the special sciences. But it’s really better just to 
reject the terms themselves. Our world has, somehow, a rich causal structure. A phi-
losopher pursuing an ontological reduction of causation wants to understand what, 
fundamentally, this structure consists in. It would seem ample motivation for such a 
project that one is, simply, curious. 
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